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-------------------------------------------IN THE
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------------CAUSE NO. 17-1234
------------ALEXANDRA HAMILTON,
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v.
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-------------------------------------------ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT
-------------------------------------------BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

JEFFREY DELLA ROCCO
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Does the individual right to possess firearms extend beyond the home?

II.

If so, is the good cause requirement a permissible limitation on an individual’s right to
possess a concealed firearm in public?

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The caption of the case names all the parties to this proceeding.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit and the
opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Columbia are contained
within the record of the case (R. at 7, 14).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on July 1, 2017. (R. at 19). Petitioner filed a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in timely fashion. This Court granted the Petition on November 13,
2017. (R. at 20). This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2012).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s fact findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “a well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
arms, shall not be infringed.”
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part,
that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the
law[.]”
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Alexandra Hamilton’s son was violently beaten and seriously injured during a
home invasion in March of 2015. (R. at 3). This incident led to Ms. Hamilton suffering daily
from panic attacks, anxiety, and developing a fear of men who resembled her son’s attacker; that
is, men with tattoos and piercings. (R. at 3, 24). Ms. Hamilton also developed a fear for her own
safety while at work, due to the fact that she often works alone. (R. at 3). Ms. Hamilton obtained
a permit to carry a concealed weapon to protect herself, and her son, from future potentially
violent confrontations. (R. at 7-8). In addition to age restrictions, required safety courses, and
criminal background checks, the Columbia Penal Code further limits the availability of
concealed carry permits to individuals who demonstrate a “good cause” for carrying. (R. at 21).
Ms. Hamilton fulfilled all prerequisite conditions, and cited her son’s attack and her resulting
fears as good-cause. (R. at 7, 24).
Approximately two months after acquiring her permit, Ms. Hamilton was on her way to
accompany her son during one of his rehabilitation treatments late one evening. (R. at 3). An
unknown man with tattoos and a facial piercing approached Ms. Hamilton while she walked
alone through the parking lot. (R. at 4). Frightened, Ms. Hamilton reflexively drew her pistol,
pointed it at the unknown man, but never discharged the weapon. (R. at 4). The approaching
stranger was an undercover police officer. He disarmed Ms. Hamilton. (R. at 4). Ms. Hamilton
had unintentionally left her wallet with her concealed carry permit at her home that evening. (R.
at 4). Consequently, she was ticketed for her inability to produce her permit and was fined
$1,000 in accordance with the Columbia Penal Code. (R. at 4, 22). Burr County then revoked
Ms. Hamilton’s permit because the county concluded that she no longer met the good cause prerequisite. (R. at 4, 8).
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In November of 2015, Ms. Hamilton filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Columbia that alleged the good-cause prerequisite for a concealedcarry permit violated her Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. (R. at 8). The district
court--looking to this Court’s reasoning in Heller v. District of Columbia 554 U.S. 570 (2008)-held that the Second Amendment secured a right for individuals to publicly carry firearms. (R. at
8). Additionally, the district court concluded that the restrictive good-cause provision of the
Columbia Penal Code levied a substantial burden on the core of the Second Amendment, and
that the good-cause requirement was unconstitutional by means of a strict scrutiny analysis. (R.
at 10, 11).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth Circuit reversed the holding of the
District Court. Specifically, the Fourteenth Circuit determined that the right protected by the
Second Amendment did not authorize citizens to publicly carry concealed firearms. (R. at 15).
The Fourteenth Circuit also concluded that the good-cause requirement was constitutional
pursuant to an intermediate scrutiny analysis of constitutionality. (R. at 16). Ms. Hamilton timely
filed a petition for certiorari which this Court granted on November 13, 2017. (R. at 20).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
This Court defined the core of the Second Amendment as an individual right to selfdefense in Heller. The Heller court concluded that the individual right to self-defense was an
intended protection of the Second Amendment by conducting an historical analysis of 18th and
19th century case law, dictionaries, and state constitutions. Most fundamentally, this core right
stems from the words “to keep and bear” of the text itself. The Heller court determined that these
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words constituted two separate rights. The right to “keep” arms guarantees the right of the public
to possess arms for the purpose of self-defense. The right to “bear” arms encompasses a
protected right to carry, or wear arms for the basis of defending oneself from potential
confrontation.
Because the right to carry for the purpose of protecting oneself from potential
confrontation is protected, and because it is undisputed that confrontation may occur outside the
home, it necessarily follows that the right to carry outside of the home is protected. As such, it is
evident from the precedent established by Heller, and the plain meaning of the word “bear”, that
the right to carry arms outside the home is included within the Second Amendment’s protections.

II.
The good cause requirement places an impermissible limitation on the protected right of
law-abiding individuals to carry a firearm in public for the purpose of self-defense. Because the
right to carry in public for self-defense is a core protection of the Second Amendment, no
amount of burden on the right is appropriate. The laws of Burr County prohibit individuals from
openly carrying firearms in public. The only means by which individuals can exercise their core
protected Second Amendment is by obtaining a Concealed Carry permit. Because the good cause
requirement limits the ability to carry a concealed weapon to individuals who “distinguish
[themselves] from the mainstream,” most Burr County citizens are unable to exercise their
Second Amendment rights. Put another way, the combination of a ban on open carry, and a
restrictive good cause requirement effectively bans the carrying of firearms in public for most
citizens of Burr County. A limitation which prohibits a majority of citizens from exercising a
protected right is unconstitutional.
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Burr County’s good cause requirement will fail any level of constitutional scrutiny.
Assuming arguendo, that strict scrutiny is applicable, Burr County must supply sufficient
evidence to support a specific compelling public interest, and that the regulation is the least
restrictive alternative means of burdening the right. Assuming further that intermediate scrutiny
is applicable, Burr County would have to establish sufficient evidence of a substantial link to an
important public interest. The county has failed to meet the requirements of either standard of
review. More specifically, Burr County fails to show that the good cause requirement is an
effective means of improving public safety or decreasing gun violence.

ARGUMENT
I. THE RIGHT TO CARRY A FIREARM OUTSIDE THE HOME IS PROTECTED BY
THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Historically, the relationship between American citizens and the possession of firearms is
well established. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). In Heller, this Court
delineated the long-standing tradition of Americans protecting the freedom to exercise their
Second Amendment rights beginning with the inception of the amendment. Id. at 605-619.
Through an historical analysis, this Court concluded that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to “possess and carry” firearms in anticipation of confrontation the purpose of
self-defense. Before moving into the Second Amendment itself, it is important to illustrate that
this Court has recognized that the Second Amendment applies to the States under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2011); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. As such, Burr County is subject to the Second Amendment
and cannot violate the protections it affords.
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The Second Amendment states that the people shall have the right “to keep and bear
arms.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. This Court has also conducted thorough analysis on the precise
meaning of the key phrase of the Second Amendment. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
592 (2008). More specifically, the meaning of the words “keep” and “bear” were scrutinized
under their dictionary definitions. Id. at 581-592. The unambiguous definition of the word
“keep” is simply to possess. Id. at 582. Further, the word “bear” was defined as “to carry” at the
time of the ratification of the constitution; the same is true of the modern definition of the word
“bear.” Id. at 584. Importantly, Heller, is not the only instance in which this Court has defined
“bear” in such a way. Ten years prior to the decision in Heller, Justice Ginsburg determined that
the phrase “carries a firearm” was suggested by the Second Amendment. Muscarello v. United
States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Ginsburg stated that a
useful interpretation of “carries a firearm” was to “wear, bear, or carry” a firearm on one’s
person. Id. Justice Ginsburg in Muscarello, and this Court in Heller each support the conclusion
that the text of the Second Amendment guarantees a right to carry. Id., Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.
A. The Second Amendment’s Purpose Establishes the Protected Right to Carry Extends
Outside the Home
An examination of the Second Amendment’s purpose sheds light on exactly how the
right to carry must extend outside the home. This Court’s precedent firmly establishes that the
intended purpose of the Second Amendment was to guarantee a right to keep and carry weapons
for the purpose of self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. As this Court in Heller states, the phrase
“bear arms” is indicative of this purpose as it particularly pertinent to confrontation. Id. at 584.
The right to carry a firearm for the purpose of self-defense is therefore protected under the
Second Amendment. Id. Here, Justice Ginsburg’s analysis from Muscarello provides additional
insight. Justice Ginsburg declared that one would carry a firearm with a preparatory purpose of
6

being equipped with a weapon “in case of conflict” with another individual. Muscarello, 524
U.S. at 143 (internal quotations omitted).
This Court’s holding in Heller demonstrates that the need for the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense from confrontation is “most acute” in
the home. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. To assume that this implies that the need exists solely in the
home is illogical. Confrontations may, and often do, arise outside of the home, and the assertion
that the Second Amendment right to self-defense from altercations for law-abiding citizens exists
only in the home simply misconstrues the intended purpose of the Second Amendment. see Id.;
see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Because the right to carry
is protected, and the purpose of this right is for self-defense, the argument that the right to carry
exists only in the home is unrealistic. The assumption that individuals can only exercise their
right to carry for the purpose of self-defense within the confines of their home is borderline
flippant. Proponents of such an argument would have to conclude that law-abiding gun owners
are carrying their weapons around their homes to exercise their Second Amendment rights which
presents an “awkward usage” that effectively separates the Second Amendment from its intended
purpose of self-defense. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936-937 (7th Cir. 2012).
The notion of Second Amendment protections extending to carrying arms for the purpose
of self-defense is exemplified in this Court’s holding in Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct.
1027 (2016). In Caetano, a woman carried a stun gun because she felt the need to protect herself
from an abusive ex-boyfriend. Id at 1028. Caetano’s violent ex-boyfriend attempted to assault
her, but she was able to deter him by threatening to use her stun gun. Id. This Court determined
that a stun gun was considered an “arm” and that it was subject to Second Amendment
protections. Id. at 1027. Under Massachusetts law, stun guns were not eligible for Second
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Amendment protection. Id. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in particular demonstrates how
Caetano’s experience is indicative the connection between the Second Amendment and the
fundamental “right of individual self-defense.” Id. at 1028-1029.
Most importantly, Caetano’s altercation with her ex-boyfriend occurred outside of her
home. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Massachusetts statute which prohibited Caetano’s
possession of the stun gun, and necessarily her ability to carry it outside her home, was deemed
unconstitutional. Id. at 1028. This statute restricted Caetano’s ability to exercise her ability to
bear arms for the purpose of self-defense. Ultimately, this supports an argument that the right to
carry outside the home for the purpose of self-defense is protected by the Second Amendment.
Cf. Id. at 1028-1029 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting approvingly that the carry of an arm provided
protection and prevention of further harm).
B. The Historical Analysis Provided by Heller Supports the Purpose and Scope of the Right
to Carry Outside the Home
In Heller, this Court conducted an historical analysis of the Second Amendment in order
support the fact that its purpose was to protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598-628. In fact, this Court reiterated the notion that the Second
Amendment merely codified a “pre-existing right.” Id. at 592. The widely understood pre-cursor
to the Second Amendment is the right of the the people to possess arms codified in the English
Bill of Rights in the middle of the 17th Century. Id. at 593. Importantly, the purpose of this right
was to ensure that citizens had “arms for their defence.” Id. This understanding of the right was
not singular to pre-ratification England. Individual state constitutions codify identical rights
shortly after ratification. See Id. at 600-603 (citing the state constitutions and statutes of
Pennsylvania, Vermont, North Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Virginia). Further, state
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legislatures, judiciaries, and legal commentary concerning the Second Amendment from
immediately post-ratification up to beyond the Civil War are in keeping with the analysis
provided by Justice Scalia in Heller. Id. at 605-629.
Some have argued that the Second Amendment’s purpose was solely for the protection of
the right to keep and bear arms with respect to the militia. However, such an interpretation of the
Second Amendment is patently at odds with the precedent of Heller. Id. at 598. Justice Scalia
indicates that although the necessity of the militia was a concern for the Second Amendment, it
was not the only reason. Id. at 599. Ultimately, the argument for a militia-centric Second
Amendment stipulates that self-defense was not a reason for the codification of the right
protected by the Second Amendment. Id. However, such an argument ignores the fact that Heller
tells us that self-defense is the “central component” of the Second Amendment. Id. The Second
Amendment protects the right to “bear”, that is, carry arms and the core purpose of the right is
for self-defense. Id. The need for self-defense does not present itself solely in the home. From
these facts, it logically follows that the right to carry recognized by the Second Amendment
extends outside the home.
Finally, Heller dictates that the right recognized by the Second Amendment is not
without limitation. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Justice Scalia suggests that there are presumptively
lawful restrictions that apply to the Second Amendment right. Id. More specifically, Heller
indicates that laws prohibiting the carrying of weapons in places “such as schools and
government buildings.” Id. Examined more closely, these types of restriction actually support the
notion that the right to carry extends outside the home. If the right to carry outside the home did
not exist, the existence of prohibitions on the places outside the home where individuals could
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carry would be illogical. Because of these prohibitions exist, it rationally follows that the right to
carry exists outside the home.

II.
THE GOOD-CAUSE RESTRICTION PLACES AN IMPERMISSIBLE BURDEN ON
SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The core of the Second Amendment includes the right of law-abiding citizens to possess
and carry firearms outside the home for the purpose of self-defense. Good-cause requirements
such as the one imposed by Burr County impermissibly infringe on that core right. Because the
good-cause requirement effectively bars law-abiding citizens from exercising their rights, the
Burr County law amounts to an impermissible burden of a protected Second Amendment right.
As such, the Burr County law cannot stand.

A.
Burr County’s Good-Cause Requirement Amounts to an Effective Ban on the
Protected Right to Carry
In Heller, this Court declared that a prohibition of handguns in the home was
unconstitutional. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. Using this precedent, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that a ban on the carrying of weapons entirely was
unconstitutional. Moore, 702 F.3d at 934. A key element to holding that the Illinois law banning
carry was unconstitutional was the fact that the Seventh Circuit correctly recognized that the
right to carry outside the home was protected by the Second Amendment. Id. at 936. After
establishing the right to carry for self-defense existed outside the home, it was coherent that the
ban on carry was impermissible. Id. The Seventh Circuit and this Court have each recognized
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that bans on protected Second Amendment rights are unconstitutional. Id.; see also Heller, 554
U.S. at 636.
Five years after the decision in Moore, The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit addressed “good-cause” requirements in Wrenn v. District of
Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In Wrenn, the court considered a good-cause provision
that required citizens to show a “greater than average” need for self defense. Id. 665-666. The
court concluded that “good-cause” requirements amounted to a total ban on the protected right to
publicly carry a firearm. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the good-cause
requirement allowed only a select minority of citizens access to their protected Second
Amendment right to carry publicly. Id. Consequently, the court determined that such a restrictive
“good-cause” provision was unconstitutional because it amounted to an effective ban on the right
to carry for self-defense for a majority of residents. Id.
Like the Seventh Circuit in Moore, the D.C. Circuit correctly interpreted Heller to
conclude that the core of the Second Amendment conventionally protects “carrying in public for
self-defense.” Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 659. The Seventh Circuit even contends that the rights to keep
and to bear are “on equal footing.” Id. at 663. Looking to history and the analysis put forth in
Heller, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the government must allow law-abiding
citizens “some reasonable means” of exercising both the right to keep and the right to bear. Id.
Because of this, the good-cause requirement, when combined with an outright ban on open-carry
was unconstitutional according to the Wrenn court. Id.
Columbia as a whole, bans the open-carrying of weapons. (R. at 23). Pursuant to the
Columbia Penal Code, persons may not publicly carry firearms without a Permit to Carry a
Concealed Weapon (CCW Permit). Columbia Penal Code § 900.1(A). It necessarily follows
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from this, that acquiring a Permit to Carry a Concealed Weapon is the sole means of exercising
the right to carry protected by the Second Amendment. Id. Among the prerequisites for obtaining
this permit is the “good cause” provision. This provision requires a citizen applying for a CCW
permit to provide a “good cause” for the ability to exercise their Second Amendment right; that
is, publicly carry a firearm. Columbia Penal Code § 900.1(F)(4).
The application for the CCW permit further defines “good cause” as a series of
conditions that differentiate the applicant “from the mainstream.” (R. at 24). Merriam-Webster
defines “mainstream” as a “prevailing direction of activity.” Mainstream, Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1961) Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581-585
(consulting 18th Century dictionaries for the definitions of “keep and bear arms”). In order to be
outside of the mainstream, one must necessarily be a minority. By definition, the mainstream is
the prevailing group--that is, the majority. Additionally, the good-cause restriction allows
individuals to exercise their protected right to carry only when the county sees fit; that is, decides
an individual is outside the mainstream, or meets the subjective standard established by county
officials (R. at 24). Like the good-cause restriction evaluated in Wrenn, Burr County’s goodcause requirement denies a majority of its citizens the ability to carry a weapon publicly. Wrenn,
864 F.3d at 666. As Justice Scalia indicated in Heller, the right of the Second Amendment is not
immune to limitation. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. However, the good-cause restriction goes beyond
a limitation, and establishes an operative ban on the protected right of individuals to publicly
carry a firearm.
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B. Burr County’s Good-Cause Requirement is Too Restrictive Under Strict Scrutiny
The two relevant tests used for determining the constitutionality of a regulation, such as
the good-cause requirement that imposes on a constitutional right are intermediate scrutiny, and
strict scrutiny. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 656. Courts deciding the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply
to a good-cause regulation would ask whether the law burdens protected conduct. Woollard, 712
F.3d at 875; see also United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). A strict
scrutiny analysis applies to regulations which “substantially impose” on the core of a
constitutional right. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000). This Court in Heller, concluded that the core of the
Second Amendment right was related to self-defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. Any regulation
which burdens the core of the right--that is, self-defense--necessarily triggers the application of
strict scrutiny. As such, the good-cause requirement substantially imposes on the core of the
Second Amendment rights of Burr County citizens. See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657; see also Moore
702 F.3d at 940. Some circuit courts have concluded that good-cause provisions do not
substantially impose on the Second Amendment. For example, the Second Circuit and the Third
Circuit have each maintained that strict scrutiny was not applicable to good-cause requirements.
Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013). However,
each court misapprehended Heller’s teachings on self-defense and the acute need to preserve it
outside the home. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96; Drake, 724 F.3d at 436.
Strict scrutiny requires that regulation which burdens constitutionally protected conduct
must be supported by a substantial or compelling state interest. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d
865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013). Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the regulation be carefully crafted
to a “compelling public interest.” Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 656. Put another way, the regulation must
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fit the compelling interest in the least restrictive way available given the circumstances. See
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 98 (2d Cir. 2012).
Importantly, the good-cause requirement put forth by Burr County does fail to meet the
“least restrictive” means requirement of strict scrutiny for a number of reasons. First, assuming
arguendo that the good-cause requirement does not institute a total ban, it nevertheless restricts
the ability of citizens that can carry to a minority. A restriction that eliminates a majority of
citizens is by no means “least restrictive.” Second, this Court in Heller stated that the handgun is
the “quintessential,” and “most popular” self-defense weapon of United States citizens. Heller,
554 U.S. at 629. The Burr County good-cause provision obstructs access to the “quintessential”
weapon utilized for the exercise of the protected right to self-defense recognized by Heller. Id. at
592. The County could undoubtedly utilize less restrictive ways of firearm regulation than a
restriction which denies a majority of law-abiding citizens access to their constitutional rights.
For instance, Burr County could try additional “sensitive area” prohibitions recognized by this
Court in Heller. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Burr County could also attempt to identify individuals
who pose a threat of crime or other dangerous activity. See e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d
638 (7th Cir. 2010) (expanding limitations on firearm possession to violent misdemeanants)
Finally, the good-cause requirement fails under the reasonable fit analysis of strict
scrutiny. Justice Silverman’s dissenting opinion in Peruta, argues that a reasonable fit is
impossible in circumstances where the good-cause standard is arbitrarily applied from county to
county. Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 958 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017)(Silverman, J. dissenting). According to the application for a
CCW in Burr County, the county is given the discretion to define good-cause. Here, the Burr
County definition is arbitrarily applied by the county. As such, the good-cause requirement
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should fail to meet the reasonable fit element of a strict scrutiny analysis. Peruta, 824 F.3d at
958.

C. Burr County’s Good-Cause Restriction Fails Under Intermediate Scrutiny
With respect to Burr County’s good-cause requirement, intermediate scrutiny is not
applicable for three specific reasons. First, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for regulations
which do not burden the core of a constitutional right. Second, Burr County has not provided
sufficient “substantial” evidence to support a reasonable fit between the good-cause requirement
and the government interest of public safety. Third, Circuit Court precedent establishes that
restrictions banning violent criminals from possessing firearms are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Booker, F.3d 12
(1st Cir. 2011). The fact that the federal government applies intermediate scrutiny to regulations
that restrict the Second Amendment rights of violent criminals indicates that a higher level of
scrutiny is appropriate for law-abiding citizens.
Assuming that intermediate scrutiny would be appropriate, the good-cause restriction still
fails to meet the requirements set by this Court’s precedent. Under intermediate scrutiny, Burr
County is required to show that the good-cause requirement must be supported by a substantial
or compelling state interest and have a reasonable fit with respect to accomplishing said interest.
Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. There is no doubt that Burr County has a compelling interest in
public safety or decreasing gun violence. However, the fact that Burr County has a compelling
interest in public safety does not condone the implementation of a restriction as acute as the
good-cause requirement. (R. at 12). As previously mentioned, Burr County’s good-cause
restriction is subjectively applied, and cannot possibly be a “reasonable fit” with respect to the
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county’s interest. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 958. Further, the Seventh Circuit addressed the fact that
recent studies have shown that bans on the carrying of weapons do not lead to an increase in gun
ownership, or an increase in homicide rates. Moore, 702 F.3d at 938-940. Ultimately, Burr
County has failed to meet the burden required by intermediate scrutiny because there is not a
reasonable fit between the restriction and the compelling interest.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
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